I. Overview: Tradition and Modernization in Indonesia
Indonesia is a country of unparalleled cultural and ecological diversity. Its tropical forests and seas are among the richest in the world; migrations, trade, colonizations, diffusion and adaptation have given rise to hundreds of distinct cultural groups across the 17,000-island archipelago. Indonesia's history has been turbulent, a characteristic that shows no sign of abating anytime soon. The half-century of Indonesian nationhood has been marked by many wrenching twists and turns, and is now entering a new period of uncertainty and change after a long interlude of relative stability under the heavy-handed authoritarian rule of ex-President Suharto.
Thirty-two years of "no holds barred" development during the "New Order" regime of ex-President Suharto exacted a heavy toll on the country's ecological resources, and weakened many indigenous cultural institutions that mediated access to and use of local resources and territories. The post-New Order period in Indonesia is bringing sweeping changes to many aspects of governance and state-society relations, particularly in the realms of decision-making processes and natural resource management. This paper explores some of the potential ramifications of these changes. In particular, it examines the construction and use of "adat" − the Indonesian language term meaning custom or customary law − and adat's role in Indonesian statehood, state-society relations, and natural resource management.
The New Order government embodied a unique combination of "traditional" Javanese patrimonialism, deference and social stratification, unfettered capitalistic acquisition and expansion, and a liberal dose of military power and pomp. This mixture gave rise to a development juggernaut that undermined existing local social and normative orders as ruthlessly as it depleted forests and other natural riches. Prominent motifs permeating New Order society and governance included frequent references to adat and the ubiquitous political mantras musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus). These were invoked as justification for a range of political measures and economic policies, and to censure anyone who tried to object.
The same "myth of adat" was conjured as well by the regime's critics, and by local communities attempting to retain or regain some control over the pace and direction of local change. Burns (1989 Burns ( , 1999 chronicles the construction of adat as a uniquely Indonesian normative and legal order during the final half century of Dutch rule in the Indies; Bourchier (1997) explores early Indonesian nationalists' use of adat as the basis of the integralistic, totalitarian state set out in the 1945 constitution, and its role as a potent "cultural-ideological instrument"
for both the Guided Democracy (1959-65) and New Order (1966-98) This promises to be a long-drawn-out process, with the powerful centralized agencies maneuvering to retain power and budgets, while most district, municipal and many provincial governments generally lack the skilled personnel or management structures to immediately assume the responsibilities being delegated. Indonesia's protracted economic crisis further complicates the process.
These changes signal a momentous shift in the management of Indonesia's natural resources, with profound implications for the rights and roles of local communities in resource management decisions and actions.
II. NGOs, Local Knowledge and Sustainable Development
As occurred in many other countries around the world, a lively and vociferous environmental NGO movement emerged in Indonesia during the late 1970s and '80s. Several factors contributed to this development, including growing domestic alarm over industrial pollution and destruction of lowland tropical forests, increasing economic and social polarization, and a draconian government decree in 1978 banning most student organizations. This latter measure, taken in response to student protests against government corruption and the accumulation of wealth by President Suharto's family and close associates, excluded campus religious organizations and nature clubs, which had the inadvertent effect of politicizing the environment in Indonesia. (It may have contributed to increased religious militancy in some quarters as well, but this is a topic for another discussion.) Environmental NGOs abounded, spearheaded by a national umbrella organization named WALHI, the Indonesian Environmental Forum.
These domestic voices and actions intersected with contemporary international discourses on ecology and sustainable development. Weinstock 1983; Dove 1986 Dove , 1990 Dove , 1993 Ellen 1985; Thorburn 2000) . There are equally striking examples of the degradation that ensues when large-scale capitalist enterprises take control of forests and fisheries, or when pioneer slash and burn agriculturalists follow logging roads into the forest interior (e.g., Padoch 1988; Brookfield 1988) . Direct causal links between the 1979 Village Government Law, institutional decline, and environmental degradation are more difficult to verify, but the assumptions are generally valid. At the very least, there exists a strong correlation between the growth of New Order state power and the pace of forest loss in the country between the 1970s and '90s. s 2 Law No. 5 of 1975 on Regional Government established a uniform and hierarchical national government structure for the entire country of Provinces, Districts (Kabupaten) and Municipalities (Kotamadya) and Sub-districts (Kecamatan). In its form and function, this structure mirrors the national armed forces territorial control apparatus.
Law No. 5 of 1979 extended this structure to the community level, creating uniform "village" governments (Desa and Kelurahan) as the lowest level of the state infrastructure. Based on a combination of (highly idealized) traditional Javanese forms and military command structures, the village government apparatu rested uneasily over autochthonous forms in most regions of the diverse country. These new structures were bolstered by their access to state financial and other resources channelled to villages for economic and infrastructure development and routine government functions.
Public discourse on this topic in Indonesia has been characterized by ample doses of hyperbole and finger-pointing. Perhaps to pre-empt its NGO critics, the government over the years issued a number of national laws promoting traditional communities' welfare and resource rights, and local community participation in spatial and land-use planning. 3 These laws were ineffectual, lacking implementation regulations or clear delegation of authority and responsibility. Meanwhile, clear-cut logging, forest conversion, mining operations and destructive fishing continued unabated. Local resistance was often met with force.
III. Reformasi
The fiscal crisis that swept through Eastern and Southeast Asia beginning in 1997 hit Indonesia particularly hard. The exchange value of the Rupiah plunged from around 2,000 to the US dollar to over 10,000. Complex formulae are being developed to determine the proportions of resource revenue that are retained in the respective districts and provinces, and how much is forwarded to Jakarta for redistribution. Laws are being drafted to specify obligations and service standards for local and regional governments, including their role in managing natural resources. District and provincial assemblies (DPRD) must issue scores of new regulations and decrees to administer these new responsibilities.
Under the decentralization scheme, central government allocations for regional governments are being greatly reduced, forcing provincial and district governments to generate a larger portion of their own revenue. In the midst of the country's protracted financial crisis, governments at all levels are hard pressed to meet routine expenses, much less provide improved services and infrastructure, and promote local development.
IV. Decentralization, Public Participation and Resource Management
Mission statements and policy documents of multilateral development agencies, international environmental organizations or political associations that promote integrated conservation and development and social equity prominently feature such terms as "decentralization,"
"community participation" and "sustainability," often in the same sentence. A caveat is in order -these are not the same thing. Nor are there necessarily inherent positive causative linkages between one and the other. Indonesia's nascent experiment indicates that decentralization does not in and of itself necessarily produce a more conducive political environment for local voice or community empowerment. Indeed, observers in Indonesia are beginning to question whether decentralization could lead to even more exploitative, inegalitarian, and environmentally harmful practices than pertained under the previous system.
Much of the international decentralized natural resource management literature seems to imply that shifting authority "down" nearer the community will somehow engender more responsible and accountable natural resource policy and practice. A good example of this premise can be found on the FAO Community Forestry Web Site:
The aim is to reduce the size and role of central government in order to increase efficiency of services, as well as to promote pluralism, democracy and public participation [emphasis added].
FAO goes on to qualify these remarks by noting that "although decentralization in natural resource management (NRM) has been implemented in many countries, this does not necessarily mean that decentralization always assures the devolution of decision-making power to the local level." They point out that many "governments with a strong authoritarian streak"
are applying "opportunistic and/or manipulative" models of decentralization and participation, "because such approaches are relatively cheap to apply and can bring considerable benefits."
Benefits to whom, though? Although Indonesia's regional autonomy policy has been in place for only a few months, certain disturbing trends are already becoming evident. A few illustrations culled from newspapers during the early months of 2001 include:
• The government of Kabupaten Kendal has threatened to cut off Kotamadya Semarang's water supply if they do not begin paying royalties for use of the Boja spring.
• Kabupaten Boyolali has similarly approached Kotamadya Solo, who responded by intimating that they will assess a head tax on "foreign workers" from Boyolali.
• Fishermen from Pekalongan, Central Java have been forbidden to ply their trade around the Masalembu Islands northeast of Madura in East Java.
• Several Kabupaten in Java are preparing regulations hoping to reap windfall profits by charging trucks road user fees and weight penalties as they pass through. Already, produce from northern Sumatra cannot be shipped to Jakarta markets, as levies charged at various points along the journey now exceed the total value of a truckload of fruit or vegetables.
• Many villages in East Java have restricted the operation of motorcycle taxis ("ojek"), allowing only those belonging to local residents to pick up passengers in ojek stands in their village. This becomes complicated in cases where people from neighboring villages depend on ojek to travel between their village and a trunk route, but where ojek from their village are not allowed to pick up passengers at the disembarkation point, and must return home empty. The neighboring villages, in turn, retaliate by levying charges on ojek from the roadside village whenever they enter. The result being that local travel has become much more complicated, antagonistic, and expensive.
• Numerous Kabupaten in East and Central Java have [unsuccessfully] attempted to draft regulations to facilitate "rational" exploitation of forest and mineral resources in centrally-controlled National Parks and other protected forest zones that fall within the boundaries of their districts.
As mentioned above, the new laws have only been in effect for a short time. It will take a concerted effort by government agencies at all levels, also donor and multilateral development bank-supported projects, domestic and international NGOs, and numerous other concerned parties, to help affect this transformation. Also, it must be noted that many of the trends described here have roots in previous historical epochs, and cannot be solely attributed to the new decentralization effort. Nonetheless, certain trends are becoming increasingly evident. These can be summed up by three evocative phrases:
• Seratus Suharto (The "100 Suhartos" effect);
• Putra daerah (The "Native Son" syndrome); and • Obsesi PAD (The "Local Revenue" obsession). Obsesi PAD: The most striking trend arising from the new decentralization laws has to do with revenues. Under a set of complex formulae, Kabupaten are permitted to retain a much larger portion of local revenues generated from taxes, user fees, and government-owned enterprises. A portion is forwarded to Jakarta, where it is pooled and used to pay national government expenses, with the remainder being redistributed to the Provinces and Kabupaten/Kota based on need (taking into account local revenues, population, poverty, natural disasters, and other considerations). Income derived from particular sectors (e.g., petroleum, mining, forestry, agriculture, tourism, real estate taxes) is subject to different formulae, with different proportions being retained or forwarded to Jakarta. Local and regional governments use a combination of their own income and central government revenue sharing, general allocation and specific allocation funds (for those entitled to receive these moneys) to pay routine expenses, provide basic services, and support local development efforts.
Under the new framework, central government funds for local governments have been reduced significantly, and local governments are now responsible for procuring most of their own revenue. In the midst of Indonesia's prolonged economic crisis, governments at all levels are finding it difficult to meet expenses. By the time they pay salaries and other routine costs, there often remains little or nothing to pay for services, maintenance, or new infrastructure and other development investments. A few resource-rich regions benefit from the new arrangement, however, the majority of provinces and Kabupaten/Kota receive far less than under the previous arrangement.
Several studies note that "regions … equate decentralization with revenues" ( 
Quo Vadis Adat?
A common utterance in many parts of the archipelago to describe excessively greedy, selfserving, or antisocial behavior is "tidak tahu adat" -one does not know (more aptly, has forgotten) adat. The present epidemic of shortsighted, destructive resource exploitation by nearly anybody who possesses the political and/or economic wherewithal to do so would seem to indicate that the nation is suffering from a case of collective amnesia. The silence surrounding the topic of adat during this critical period is all the more surprising given the role that adat plays in defining Indonesian state and nationhood, also the previous regime's tremendous investment in ideological education and propaganda, along with the identification of adat with social justice and wise resource stewardship by the regime's NGO critics. In the midst of the upheaval that is reaching virtually every facet of Indonesian society and politics, the lack of public discussion about customary institutions and mores strikes this writer as extremely odd.
As discussed previously, the popular discourses of decentralization and community-based resource management share the premise that shifting resource management control to stakeholders and decision-makers living in proximity with, and dependent upon, local natural resources will inherently lead to sounder resource management practices. Furthermore, indigenous people's rights, customary resource management institutions and indigenous knowledge systems discourses stress that many traditional communities have developed appropriate and sustainable resource stewardship practices, institutions and supporting mores over generations of intimate contact with nature that surrounds them.
Indonesia currently faces a situation where these various factors could, and should, converge.
The country is still rich with traditional management practices and institutions, adat is ac- Elsewhere, the law states that "Kabupaten/Kota governments or other third parties planning to develop housing, industrial or service projects in a village area must involve the Village Government and BPD in the planning, implementation and supervision thereof," and that "Kabupaten/Kota Regulations must acknowledge and respect Village rights, customs, and traditions" (Articles 110 and 111).
Early evidence from several areas in Indonesia indicates that this law is leading to some radical transformations of the political landscape in many villages. In other areas, however, the process has been hijacked by the entrenched political elite. Nonetheless, the concept of autonomous village governments, empowered to make regulations and required to protect local custom and tradition, signals a major shift in state-village relations in Indonesia. Particularly in areas where adat practice and institutions managed to survive three decades of force-fed development programs, the potential for developing or reviving community-based common property resource management regimes is greater now than it has been in a long time.
Additional research is needed to identify and analyze cases where changes in the regional and village government laws in Indonesia are leading to a revival of customary resource management practices. Probably the greatest hope to conserve Indonesia's dwindling natural resources lies in individual communities' success in resuscitating and adapting customary resource management practices as a means of regaining and retaining control over the utilization and management of natural assets.
Concluding Remarks
As Indonesia's "multi-dimensional crisis" drags on, there are increasing calls to retract or re- (Mallarangreng, pers.com. 2001) .
As complicated as it is, the administrative and fiscal reform discussed above is but one small step in the larger process of decentralizing governance in Indonesia. What is described here is an attempt to transfer some management and administrative function and authority to lower levels of the national government structure. This is a far cry from devolution of resource management authority to local communities -a process that will require far-reaching changes in political culture and institutions in Indonesia. Numerous groups and individuals throughout the country -including some national and local politicians -are hard at work attempting to foster the institutions, norms and capabilities needed to move the country toward more inclusive, equitable and sound environmental management practice. Hopefully these efforts will bear fruit while the country still has some resources -and a government.
